Plea Of Self-Defense: Admissibility Of Evidence
Of Deceased\u27S Character by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 8
Spring 3-1-1968
Plea Of Self-Defense: Admissibility Of Evidence Of
Deceased'S Character
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Plea Of Self-Defense: Admissibility Of Evidence Of Deceased'S Character, 25 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 85
(1968), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol25/iss1/8
1968] CASE COMMENTS 85
PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
OF DECEASED'S CHARACTER
It is well established that upon a plea of self-defense1 in a homicide
or assault prosecution, the defendant can offer evidence of the de-
ceased's violent character.2 However, the purpose for which the
character evidence can be offered and the form in which it can be
presented have been subject to various and sometimes conflicting
qualifications.
State v. Johnson3 is a recent example of the courts' treatment of
these problems. On trial for murder in the lower court, the defendant,
Fred Johnson, had entered a plea of self-defense. According to John-
son, the deceased, Travis Ray, had come to his home carrying a pistol.
An argument ensued, and, when Ray reached for his pistol, Johnson
shot him. A revolver was found in Ray's pocket. In support of his
plea of self-defense, Johnson, out of the jury's hearing, related three
specific instances in which Ray had been violent. Johnson had been
present as a bystander on two of the occasions. The third instance
involved an altercation between Ray and his wife, which had been
related to Johnson by the wife. Each of the occurrences was known
to Johnson prior to his encounter with Ray. The trial court excluded
testimony on each instance and limited the defendant to testifying to
violent acts of the deceased toward him personally. On appeal it was
held that Johnson should have been allowed to introduce evidence of
any specific violent acts of Ray that were known to him.
In allowing the defendant's character testimony, the court recog-
nized the first of the following theories upon which such evidence is
usually offered. When a defendant pleads self-defense, character evi-
dence becomes relevant to show: (i) the apprehensive mind of the
"Self-defense must be pleaded and sufficient evidence of it presented in order
to render character evidence admissible. Farley v. State, 279 Ala. 98, 182 So. 2d
364 (1966); People v. Brophy, 122 Cal. App. 2d 638, 265 P.2d 593 (1954); State v.
Gray, 179 Kan. 133, 292 P.2d 698 (1956); Pinter v. State, 203 Miss. 344, 34 So. 2d
723 (1948); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942);
Harrison v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. R. 634 (1884).
2Homicide prosecutions: Evans v. United States, io8 App. D.C. 323, 277 F.2d
354 (196o); Brooks v. State, 263 Ala. 386, 82 So. 2d 553 (1955); People v. Stallworth,
364 Mich. 528, 111 N.W.2d 742 (1961); People v. Yankouski, 143 N.Y.S.2d 737
(1955); Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 19o Va. 917, 59 S.E.2d 102 (195o); Lee v.
Commonwealth, 188 Va. 360, 49 S.E.2d 6o8 (1948); 2 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 246
(3d ed. 194o). Assault prosecutions: People v. Brophy, 122 Cal. App. 2d 638, 265
P.2d 593 (1954); Wilcher v. State, 87 Ga. App. 93, 73 S.E.2d 57 (1962); State v. Engels,
2 NJ. Super. 126, 64 A.2d 897 (1949).
s27o N.C. 215, 154 S.E.2d 48 (1967).
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defendant at the time of the affray, 4 or (2) who was the aggressor. 5 The
purpose for which the evidence is admitted is usually dependent upon
the factor of knowledge. If the deceased's violent character was known
to the defendant, it is relevant to explain the accused's state of mind
or apprehension at the time of the encounter.6 Conversely, if the
deceased's violent character was unknown to the defendant, it be-
comes relevant only on the question of who was the aggressor.
7
The particular evidence offered to prove the deceased's character
may be in one of two forms: (i) the deceased's general reputation for
'Mendez v. State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032 (1924); State v. Gordon, 37 Del. 219,
181 A. 361 (1935); Nance v. Fike, 244 N.C. 368, 93 S.E.2d 443 (1956); State v. Rawley,
237 N.C. 233, 74 S.E.2d 620 (1953); People v. Flournoy, 14 App. Div. 2d 854, 221
N.Y.S.2d 142 (g6i); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 766, 2o S.E.2d 509
(1942); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 246, 248 (3 d ed. 194o).
WMong Ming Club v. Tang, 77 Ariz. 63, 266 P.2d 1091 (1954); Miller v. State,
240 Ind. 398, 166 N.E.2d 338 (196o); People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 111
N.W.2d 742 (1961); People v. Cellura, 288 Mich. 54, 284 N.W. 643 (1939); State v.
Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, 1o4 N.W.2d 65o (1960); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim.
6o2, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954).
'People v. Jefferson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 278, 93 P.2d 230 (1939); Gunther v. State,
288 Md. 404, 179 A.2d 88o (1962); People v. Flournoy, 14 App. Div. 2d 854, 221
N.Y.S.2d 142 (g6i); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 246 (3 d ed. 1940). Such known character
evidence may also be used to show who was the aggressor, though it is more frequ-
ently used to show state of mind. Brooks v. State, 263 Ala. 386, 82 So. 2d 553 (1955);
People v. Jefferson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 278, 93 P.2d 230 (1939); Gunther v. State, 288
Md. 404, 179 A.2d 88o (1962); People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 111 N.W.2d
742 (1961).
'Evans v. United States, io8 App. D.C. 323, 277 F.2d 354 (196o); People v.
Jefferson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 278, 93 P.2d 230 (1939); State v. Wilson, 236 Iowa 429, 19
N.W.2d 232, 239 (1945); State v. Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, io4 N.W.2d 650, 656 (196o);
Rich v. Cooper, 234 Ore. 300, 380 P.2d 613 (1963); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim.
602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954); 1 J. Wsaasoiu, EVIDENCE § 63 (3 d ed. 1940).
Under each theory, as a prerequisite to receiving character testimony, a founda-
tion must be laid by the introduction of other evidence in order to bring self-
defense into issue. State of mind theory: Farley v. State, 279 Ala. 98, 182 So. 2d
364 (1966); State v. Wallace, 83 Ariz. 220, 319 P.2d 529 (1957); People v. Yokum,
145 Cal. App. 2d 245, 302 P.2d 4o6 (1956); People v. Brophy, 122 Cal. App. 2d
638, 265 P.2d 593 (1954); People v. Yankouski, 143 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1955); Harris v.
State, 400 P.2d 64 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va.
752, 767, 20 S.E. 509 (1942); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 246 (3 d ed. 194o). Aggressor
theory: Mong Ming Club v. Tang, 77 Ariz. 63, 266 P.2d lo91 (1954); People v.
Jefferson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 278, 93 P.2d 230 (1939); Smithwick v. State, 199 Ga. 292,
34 S.E. 28, 32 (1945); State v. Tobias, 218 La. 226, 48 So. 2d 9o5 (195o); Rich v.
Cooper, 234 Ore. 300, 380 P.2d 613 (1963). It is immaterial whether the foundation
was laid in the evidence of the state or in that of the defendant. State v. Wilson
236 Iowa 429, 19 N.W.2d 232 (1945); accord State v. Wallace, 83 Ariz. 220, 319 P.2d
529 (1957). Absent a foundation, character evidence will not be admitted. Mathis
v. State, 21o Ga. 4o8, 8o S.E.2d 159 (1954); Nixon v. State, 204 Md. 475, 1o% A.2d
243 (1954); State v. Helm, 66 Nev. 286, 209 P.2d 187 (1949).
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violence, or (2) specific acts of violence by the deceased.8 An over-
whelming weight of authority allows evidence of general reputation
in practically all instances.9 Specific acts, however, have been subject
to conflicting treatment by the courts. Their admissibility is depen-
dent upon the purpose for which they are offered.
The use of specific acts to show the state of mind of the defendant
was prohibited for a long time.1 0 This can be attributed to the courts
viewing the proffer of specific acts as an attempt to prove character.
The courts are loathe to reason that because an individual acted
violently on one occasion he also acted violently on another.1 1 How-
ever; the objection presented by this rationale has been avoided
by viewing the proffer of evidence as explanatory of the apprehensive
mind of the defendant and not as an attempt to prove bad character.'-
2
Consequently, many jurisdictions now allow specific acts.'8 Johnson
is in accord with the modem view. The rationale in permitting the
introduction of specific acts is to afford the jury an opportunity
8Marshall v. United States, 45 App. D.C. 373, 383 (Ct. App. 1916); People v.
Casserio, 16 Cal. App. 2d 223, 6o P.2d 505 (1936); Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653, 35
A.2d 916 ('944); People v. Flournoy, 14 App. Div. 854, 221 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1961);
Harris v. State, 4oo P.2d 64 (Okla. Crim. App. 1965); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex.
Grim. 6o02, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954) (dictum).
'State of mind theory: e.g., Mendez v. State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032 (1924);
State v. Morgan, 245 N.C. 215, 95 S.E.2d 507 (1956); Mortimore v. State, 24 Wyo.
452, 161 P. 766 (1916); 2 J. WiGMOR., EVIDENCE § 246 (3d ed. 1940). Aggressor theory:
e.g., Evans v. United States, io8 App. D.C. 323, 277 F.2d 354 (1960); Marshall v.
United States, 45 App. D.C. 373, 383 (Ct. App. 1916); Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. .224,
55 P.2d 312 (1936); Bridges v. State, 176 Ark. 756, 4 S.W.2d 12 (1928); People v.
Soules, 41 Cal. App. 2d 298, 1o6 P.2d 639 (194o) (dictum); State v. Wilson, 236
Iowa 429, 19 N.W.2d 232 (1945); State v. Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, 1o4 N.W.2d 65o
(196o); Rich v. Cooper, 234 Ore. 3oo, 380 P.2d 613 (1963) (dictum). Contra, State
v. Padula, 1o6 Conn. 454, 138 A. 456 (1927); People v. Rodewald, 177 N.Y. 408, 70
N.E. 1 (1go4).
"Mendez v. State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032 (1924); 2 J. WIGaioRE, EVIDENCE § 248
(3d ed. 1946).
ni J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192, 193 (3 d ed. 1940).
nSee State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); Fields v. State, 85 Okla.
Grim. 439, 188 P.2d 231 (1947); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Grim. 602, 266 S.W.2d
875 (1954); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942);
Mortimore v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, 161 P. 772 (1916); 2 J. WIaatORE, EVIDENCE § 248
(3d ed. 1940).
'3E.g., McGuff v. State, 248 Ala. 259, 27 So. 2d 241 (1946); State v. Jackson, 94
Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); State v. Wallace, 83 Ariz. 220, 319 P.2d 529 (1957);
Mendez v. State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032 (1924); Harris v. State, 400 P.2d 64 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1965); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Grim. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954); 2 J.
WIV GORE, EVIDENCE § 248 (3d ed. 1940). The number and type of specific acts to
be admitted is within the discretion of the court. Rasnake v. Commonwealth, 135
Va. 677, 115 S.E. 543 (1923); 1 J. WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 198 (3d ed. 1940).
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to determine if the defendant acted in apprehension and if his plea
of self-defense is well founded.
14
Courts disagree as to the admissibility of specific acts of the de-
ceased offered to show that he was the aggressor. 15 A majority of juris-
dictions reject such evidence on the ground that it is collateral and
necessitates proof of each previous affray to fairly determine whether
the deceased was warranted in acting as he did.16 As a result, the trial
would be prolonged and the party against whom the evidence is
offered would be greatly disadvantaged, since no one, without due
notice, could explain all previous acts that might be presented.--
A minority of jurisdictions, while recognizing that the admissibility
of specific acts should be subject to sound discretion, allow them to
be proven to show who was the aggressor. 18 In so doing, it would
seem that the courts are deciding contrary to the firm rule of evidence
that when character is used to prove an act, other specific acts cannot
be used to prove violent character.' 9 Based on this principle, the
objection to using specific acts to show the defendant's apprehensive
state of mind was reasoned away as such acts were not being used
to prove character, but merely to show state of mind.20 However,
when specific acts are used to show who was the aggressor, they,
in effect, are used to prove character. Nevertheless, a minority of
jurisdictions allow character to be proven by specific acts when used
to show who was the aggressor.
The minority rule allowing the introduction of specific acts to
show who was the aggressor reveals a variance in the treatment given
a defendant and that given the deceased in regard to character
evidence. In homicide prosecutions where a plea of self-defense is en-
"Evans v. United States, so8 App. D.C. 323, 277 F.2d 354 (196o); Mendez v.
State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032 (1924); Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404, 179 A.2d
88o (1962); Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653, 35 A.2d 916, 919 (1944); Dempsey v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954).
'See Randolph v. Commonwealth, igo Va. 256, 56 S.E.2d 226, 230 (1949).
6E.g., Bridges v. State, 176 Ark. 756, 4 S.W.2d 12 (1928); People v. Soules, 41
Cal. App. 2d 298, io6 P.2d 639 (s94o); McGill v. Commonwealth, 365 S.W.2d 470
(Ky. 1963); People v. Cellura, 288 Mich. 54, 284 N.W. 643 (1939); State v. Keaton,
258 Minn. 359, 104 N.W.2d 650 (196o).
"Richmond v. City of Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921).
"E.g., Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954); Randolph
v. Commonwealth, igo Va. 256, 56 S.E.2d 226 (1949); State v. Waldron, 71 W. Va.
1, 75 S.E. 558 (1912); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 63, 198 (3d ed. 1940).
101 J. WIGlMtORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192, 193 (3 d ed. 194o).
"°State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); Fields v. State, 85 Okla.
Crim. 439, 188 P.2d 231 (1947); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875
('954); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 5o9 (1942); Mortimore
v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, i61 P. 772 (1916); 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 248 (3 d ed. 1940).
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tered it logically has been reasoned that the deceased becomes a
quasi-defendant with the true defendant as his accuser.21 If this analysis
is accepted, the inconsistent treatment of the defendant and the
deceased becomes apparent. The minority rule allows the introduction
of specific, violent acts of the deceased to show who was the aggressor.
22
However, specific acts generally are not admissible when character is
used to prove the act of which a defendant is accused.23 Thus, if the
deceased is viewed as a defendant being accused of the act of aggression,
he is being denied the protection of this rule in those jurisdictions
where specific acts may be used to prove the act of aggression.
24
A further examination of the treatment specific acts have received
by the courts reveals additional inconsistencies. When used to show
the defendant's state of mind such evidence is generally admitted,
25
while when used to show who was the aggressor it usually is prohib-
ited.26 The question is thus raised whether allowing specific acts under
the state-of-mind theory is consistent with excluding them on the
question of who was the aggressor. The objection to their use under the
former theory was reasoned away by the fact that specific acts are
not being used to prove either character or an act, but only to show
state of mind.27 As a result, most jurisdictions allow them under the
state-of-mind theory.28 In so doing, the courts are apparently ignoring
""'On the same theory, when a prisoner sets up a defense, like the one at
bar [self-defense] ... he charges the deceased with an act of personal violence
against him, and thereby becomes the accuser and makes the deceased the ac-
cused...." Commonwealth v. Castellana, 277 Pa. 117, 121 A. 50, 52 (1928).
--E.g., Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954); Randolph
v. Commonwealth, i9o Va. 256, 56 S.E.2d 226 (1949); State v. Waldron, 71 W. Va.
1, 75 S.E. 558 (1912).
23 J. WIGMoRE, EVDENcE §§ 192, 193 (3 d ed. 1940).21E.g., Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954); Randolph
v. Commonwealth, 19o Va. 256, 56 S.E.2d 226 (1949); 1 J. WIGAMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 63,
198 (3d ed. 1940).
23E.g., AMcGuff v. State, 248 Ala. 259, 27 So. 2d 241 (1946); State v. Jackson, 94
Ariz. 117, 882 P.2d 229 (1963); State v. Wallace, 83 Ariz. 22o, 319 P.2d 529 (1957);
Mendez v. State, 27 Ariz. 82, 229 P. 1032 (1942); Harris v. State, 400 P.2d 64 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1965); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954);
2 J. WMom, EVIDENCE § 248 (3d ed. 1940).
2E.g., Bridges v. State, 176 Ark. 756, 4 S.W.2d 12 (1928); People v. Soules, 41
Cal. App. 2d 298, 106 P.2d 639 (1940); McGill v. Commonwealth, 365 S.W.2d 420
(Ky. 1963); State v. Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, 104 N.W.2d 650 (1960).
"State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); Fields v. State, 85 Okla.
Crim. 439, I88 P.2d 231 (1947); Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 602, 266 S.W.2d
875 (1954); Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 767, 20 S.E.2d 509 (1942); Morti-
more v. State, 24 Wyo. 452, 161 P. 772 (1916); 2 J. WIGMioRE, EVIDENCE § 248 (3d
ed. 1940).
21Cases cited note 26 supra.
